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The Role of Authorisation in Title Conflicts Involving 
Retention of Title Clauses: Some American Lessons 
Dr Sean Thomas 
This article considers the lack of protection granted to purchasers of goods encumbered with 
retention of title clauses.  In chains of transactions, disponees are only able to acquire such 
title that their immediate disponor had.  The difficulties involved in determining the extent to 
which the title is encumbered is magnified as chains of transactions extend.  English law fails 
to fully acknowledge the vital role of authorisation in cases involving pre-existing but 
unknowable encumbrances.  The failures of English law can be usefully contrasted with the 
situation in the United States of America.  Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 
a security interest can pass with the goods upon disposition, yet if the disposition is 
authorised, the security interest will merely attach to the proceeds of the disposition.  The 
final purchaser will be able to retain the goods.  Although prima facie similar to English law, 
the American case-law demonstrates that authorisation plays a substantially more influential 
role, and reduces the risk to purchasers in comparison with English law. 
Keywords: Retention of Title Clauses; Sales; Authorisation; Security Interests; Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
I. Introduction 
Following a disposition of goods by a non-owner or a disponee with a limited title, a conflict 
will exist between the true owner or the holder of a security interest and the third party 
purchaser, due to the operation of the rule nemo dat quod non habet.1  Locating the true 
ownership of goods can be a challenge, particularly if there is a long chain of transactions.2  
This challenge is exacerbated by the use of retention of title clauses,3 and the lack of clarity in 
English law as to the impact of such clauses on nemo dat conflicts.  In English law retention 
of title clauses are not security interests,4 even if at a functional level ‘the seller retains his 
title in his goods, for the purpose of providing himself with security.’5  For de Lacy the 
security interest expressed in a retention of title clause is in ‘abeyance’ up until the buyer (for 
example) becomes insolvent and the seller holding the retention of title clause wishes to 
protect their interest.6  Consequently it could be argued that the buyer could rely on ‘waiver’ 
on the part of the seller,7 in the context of sub-sales where ‘the seller does not complain if the 
buyer does not in fact account to him for that dealing’.8  It is this possibility which is tested in 
this article.9  Arguably the American law on security interests, under the Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”) Article 9, provides a clearer and more coherent system for 
dealing with retention of title and nemo dat conflicts.  This suggestion rests on the distinction 
between English and American law as to the role and importance of authorisation of sub-
sales, combined with explicit policy choices favouring the innocent purchaser and the free 
flow of goods. 
II. The Buyer in Possession under English Law 
The Factors Act 1889 (“FA”), s. 9 provides that where a middleman buys goods and obtains 
possession, but with some condition to the transaction as yet unfulfilled, the middleman is 
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still able to pass good title to an innocent purchaser.10  The provision is replicated in the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979 (“SGA”), s. 25(1), which reads as follows: 
 
Where a person, having bought or agreed to buy goods, obtains with the consent of 
the seller possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods, the delivery 
or transfer, by that person or by a mercantile agent acting for him, of the goods or 
documents of title, under any sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof, [or under any 
agreement for sale, pledge, or other disposition thereof,] to any person receiving the 
same in good faith and without notice of any lien or other right of the original seller in 
respect of the goods, shall have the same effect as if the person making the delivery or 
transfer were a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or documents of title with 
the consent of the owner. 
 
The words in square brackets are absent from the SGA.  This distinction, ‘one of the oddities 
of the [SGA]’,11 was at the root of the conflict in Re Highway Foods International Ltd, Mills 
v Harris (Wholesale Meat Ltd) (hereafter “Highway Foods”).12  Highway Foods was a 
decision of Edward Nugee QC (sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court).  In Highway 
Foods, the owner (Harris) sold a large quantity of meat to the middleman (Highway) under a 
retention of title clause whereby title would only pass on payment.  Highway then sold the 
goods on to the purchaser (Kingfry), also under a retention of title clause.  In neither sale did 
payment pass, but the meat was delivered, first to Highway then to Kingfry.  Upon inspection 
of the goods, Kingfry found a metal tag.  Rather than complaining to Highway, Kingfry 
complained directly to Harris.  Because neither Kingfry nor Highway had actually yet paid 
for the goods, Kingfry and Harris agreed that Harris would repossess that portion of the 
goods that had not already been processed.  This was justified on the basis of the retention of 
title clause between Harris and Highway: ‘The Seller reserves the right to enter and collect 
from any premises goods in their original or altered form where monies are overdue’.13  It 
was also agreed that the goods would remain with Kingfry during this trade – the 
“repossession” was merely a fiction.  The plan was that Harris would inspect the meat, and 
Kingfry would then pay Harris directly for the meat following a satisfactory inspection, at the 
same price that Highway was charged (thus representing a valuable discount for Kingfry).  
Highway was essentially cut out of the deal.  Highway entered receivership, and the receiver 
argued that Kingfry had obtained good title via the FA, s. 9, on the grounds that Highway had 
been a buyer in possession, and that there had been a delivery to Kingfry under an agreement 
for sale.  This argument, if valid, would have the effect of preventing Harris from 
repossessing the goods from Highway, because the goods were already (by virtue of s. 9) 
Kingfry’s goods, and (importantly for the receiver) Kingfry would be obliged to pay 
Highway.  It is clear why this analysis was attractive to the receiver, and it is easy to see why 
Harris and Kingfry rejected this approach.   
The problem facing Edward Nugee QC was deceptively straightforward: did the extra 
words in the FA, s. 9 cover this case?  Highway’s transaction with Kingfry had been a mere 
agreement to sell the goods, under a condition of payment.  However, the buyer in possession 
exception in the SGA does not cover agreements to sell, whereas the FA version does.  
Edward Nugee QC concluded that the answer to the problem in Highway Foods lay in the 
final words of FA, s. 9, where the reference to mercantile agency meant that reference to FA, 
s. 2(1) (the mercantile agency exception) was required.14  It might be that the reference back 
to the mercantile agency exception of FA, s. 2(1), which is restricted to sales, pledges or other 
dispositions (and does not extend to agreements to sell, pledge or otherwise dispose) 
necessarily limits the effect of FA, s. 9 to sales.15  However, ‘[t]he exact effect of this 
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argument is not entirely clear’,16 and the wording used by Edward Nugee QC indicates his 
connecting of FA, ss 2 (1) and 9 was in order to underscore the need for authorisation:  
 
the effect of s. 2(1) is only to render the buyer’s agreement for sale as valid as if it had 
been expressly authorised by the seller; and this is not enough to get the sub-purchaser 
home if the conditions for the passing of title under the buyer’s agreement for sale to 
the sub-purchaser have not been satisfied.17   
 
Such that there was any authorisation by Harris at the time that Highway made the 
disposition to Kingfry, it was limited by the retention of title clause still covering the goods.  
The purchaser only had, until he had paid the price to the middleman, a mere agreement to 
buy to set up against the owner.  Thus, as Benjamin’s Sale of Goods puts it (citing Highway 
Foods): ‘No title will … pass under an agreement for a sale.’18  Ulph concludes that ‘it is 
difficult to see how, after Highway Foods, the additional words contained in s. 9 can be seen 
as having any meaningful role whatsoever.’19  Ulph’s conclusion has been reinforced by the 
approval and application of Highway Foods in P4 Limited v Unite Integrated Solutions,20 
where Ramsey J said that the protection available for the purchaser in cases involving a 
retention of title clause is limited to protection against a conversion claim by the owner.21 
The widespread use of retention of title clauses means that the Highway Foods 
approach creates a substantial level of risk for a potentially large number of purchasers,22 
who are only protected against a conversion claim.  Whilst this provides some protection for 
purchasers which would be otherwise absent if there had been a crude application of the 
nemo dat rule, if the purchaser had already paid part of the price to the middleman, the 
purchaser might be required to pay more than he bargained for in order to obtain the goods.  
There has been, in essence, a judicial constriction of the statutory protection for purchasers,23 
and ‘it has become extraordinarily difficult for any innocent party to bring himself within its 
provisions.’24  The limited discussion of the role of authorisation in Highway Foods is 
remedied somewhat though by the recent decision of the Court of Appeal, Fairfax Gerrard 
Holdings Ltd v Capital Bank Plc (hereafter “Fairfax”).25   
In Fairfax, Dimond was in the business of acquiring printing machines and sub-selling 
them for profit.  Dimond accepted an order by Carrprint for goods, following which Dimond 
ordered the goods from its supplier.  The claimants enabled Dimond’s acquisition of the 
goods by means of a finance agreement whereby the claimants purchased the goods and then 
sold them to Dimond under retention of title terms, whereby Dimond could sell the goods in 
the ordinary course of business subject to the proceeds being held on trust for the claimants.26  
Dimond sub-sold the goods to a sub-purchaser who had acquired finance from the defendant 
bank (also under retention of title terms).  Dimond went into liquidation without paying off 
the claimants.  The claimants argued that the defendants could not demonstrate they had 
acted without notice of the claimants’ interest in the goods, and as such they were not 
protected by claiming Dimond had ostensible authority to pass title to them.27  The Court of 
Appeal thus had to decide whether Dimond had any express or implied actual authority or 
consent from the claimants to pass title to the defendants.28 
 It was held that Dimond did have implied actual authority to pass title.  This was 
based on the particular facts;29 here the combination of a trust receipt (purporting to impose a 
trust over monies received by Dimond) and the finance agreement was sufficient to 
demonstrate the necessary authority (whilst also being insufficient to demonstrate an 
obligation on Dimond to precisely identify its sub-purchasers).30  In Atiyah’s Sale of Goods 
the decision in Fairfax is construed as demonstrating that  
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[a] reservation of title clause will not usually restrict the buyer’s right to resell the 
goods in the course of his business, because that is not the purpose behind the clause 
… [thus] even in the absence of an express authority to resell, such an authority will 
often be readily implied from the very nature of the transaction as a whole.31 
 
Loi has criticised the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, as it appeared to let an implied term 
trump other express terms of the relevant agreements.32  For Loi, a more appropriate scenario 
would have been the utilisation by the claimants of a retention of title clause like that used to 
cover the sub-sale in Highway Foods,33 whereby the sub-sale could have been allowed 
without any accompanying authorisation to pass title prior to full payment.34  Whilst this 
author struggles to quite see the distinction between the retention of title clauses used in 
Highway Foods and Fairfax, Loi is quite correct in seeing it as unfortunate that Highway 
Foods was not cited in Fairfax.35  For Loi, the most appropriate mechanism would have been 
to give effect to the retention of title provision, such that the claimants retain title to the goods 
until full payment, and any payment by sub-buyers direct to the claimants or into a trust fund 
(like that envisaged by the trust receipt in Fairfax) would merely reduce the middleman’s 
debt pro tanto: ‘In light of the efficacy of such alternative arrangements, it is difficult to see 
why it was necessary to imply into para 6 of the finance agreement any authority on 
Dimond’s part to pass title to the defendants.’36  The Court’s implication of authority ‘flatly 
contradicts the express terms of the contract’, and in light of this ‘and [the fact] that the 
defendants were aware of the finance agreement when they entered into the sub-sale 
agreement’, the Court’s conclusion ‘becomes less plausible.’37  The strength of this argument 
would appear to derive from the focus on notice in Clough Mill Ltd v Martin,38 and, 
consequently, Highway Foods.39 
 Two criticisms of Loi’s argument can be raised.  First, it does not necessarily follow 
that a sub-purchaser’s awareness of the existence of a finance agreement is sufficient to prove 
either that there was knowledge of a breach of that agreement, nor that such a sub-sale is 
necessarily a breach in itself of that agreement.  The Court of Appeal in Fairfax was quite 
correct to note that the presence of retention of title clauses must be read in light of 
commercial reality, and in particular, that commerce would be overly restricted were 
retention of title clauses to automatically override sub-sales of goods covered by such 
clauses.  Consequently, it would be unreal to automatically assume knowledge of the 
existence of the commercially reasonable situation of a retention of title clause suffices to 
show knowledge of the terms of that clause.  Secondly, Loi appears to be viewing the chain 
of transactions from the perspective of the financier, and in light of a notion that financiers 
should be able to substantially control the down-ward chain of transactions.  The suggestion 
Loi puts forward, as a more effective way of dealing with the risk inherent in the sort of 
transaction in Fairfax, appears to necessitate the withdrawal from the middleman of any 
control of the financial aspect of the transaction.  This is not intrinsically wrong, but, it is for 
the financier to negotiate with the middleman in such a way that the financier is clearly in 
control: this, of course, was not the case in Fairfax, where the financiers merely appeared to 
have failed to clearly set out the limits of Dimond’s authority.  Had the Court of Appeal held 
in favour of the claimants, then they would have had a windfall on the basis of their initially 
poor contracting.40 
 The combined effect of Highway Foods and Fairfax illustrates the unsatisfactory 
nature of English law where one party (the final purchaser) has relied on another’s behaviour, 
specifically those situations where another party (the secured party) has allowed that reliance 
to occur by failing (whether through choice or incompetence) to maintain control over goods.  
Where a chain of transactions increases, and when different parties in the chain introduce 
retention of title clauses, parties at the end of the chain have a drastically lower capacity to 
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know about or control the content and effect of such clauses.  It is thus unrealistic to rely on 
notice as a means of solving such problems: the fact a party has notice (or knowledge) of a 
retention of title clause cannot, without more, justify imposing the risk of loss on such a 
party.  These complications are magnified because it is rarely (if ever) the point of a retention 
of title clause to prevent the disposition of goods.  It is consequently unsatisfactory to state, as 
in Atiyah’s Sale of Goods, that retention of title clauses are not too problematic because (a) 
authority to resell ‘will often be readily implied’, and (b) situations involving re-sales will be 
adequately covered by the buyer in possession exceptions of SGA, s. 25(1) and FA, s. 9.  
Because dispositions under retention of title clauses are technically agreements to sell, and 
are thus outside SGA, s. 25(1), as a consequence of Highway Foods a purchaser of goods 
cannot be secure in his acquisition.  Similarly, any claim as to the obviousness that 
dispositions made with the authority of the party retaining title enable the passage of 
relatively good title to the purchaser – the suggestion in Fairfax – must be subject to criticism 
for over-simplification, as well as possibly failing to recognise the true impact of Highway 
Foods.41  A comparison with the UCC demonstrates that the problems evidenced by the 
decisions in Highway Foods and Fairfax can be eradicated by a broader (yet commercially 
realistic and jurisprudentially acceptable) understanding of the role of authorisation in chains 
of sales involving retention of title clauses.  Such a comparison will illustrate the value in 
having a specific legal rule concerning authorisation, as opposed to the English approach of 
resting everything on the particular facts of the case at hand. 
III. The Uniform Commercial Code 
The starting point for any assessment of the UCC is §1-103(a), which states that the UCC  
 
must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies, 
which are: (1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial 
transactions; (2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through 
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and (3) to make uniform the law among 
the various jurisdictions. 
 
In light of these purposes of the UCC, more specific policies concerning nemo dat conflicts 
can be deduced from various academic and judicial comments.  Estoppel, often phrased in 
terms of apparent ownership,42 gives effect to the policy that when the middleman has 
possession, the purchaser should be protected.43  However, whilst important early cases in the 
development of judicial understanding of the UCC’s nemo dat law suggested that the nemo 
dat exceptions were founded on estoppel,44 it is important to acknowledge that the UCC’s 
nemo dat provisions should not be restricted by the limited nature of the estoppel doctrine.45  
The best approach is probably that the UCC is merely a modern expression of a broad general 
estoppel principle.46  The importance of this approach should not be underestimated.  English 
law has consistently failed to accept estoppel reasoning as a means of determining nemo dat 
conflicts,47 which may explain the very limited impact of authorisation as an explanatory or 
justificatory mechanism in the retention of title cases (ie Highway Foods and Fairfax).  
However, estoppel alone cannot provide a sufficient theoretical basis for the nemo dat 
provisions of the UCC.48  Thus, building on this basic principle, the drafters of the UCC 
made a significant and blatant choice in favour of a purchaser as opposed to an owner in 
nemo dat disputes.49  This choice can be justified as recognition of the ‘commercial 
desirability of enhancing the marketability of goods.’50  Furthermore, as the New York Law 
Revision Commission said, ‘special inquiry as to the title or actual authority of the seller is 
both unusual in practice and would, if required as a general practice, hinder the conduct of 
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business.’51  The protection and enhancement of the free flow of commerce is supported by 
an express policy of placing the risk of loss onto the person best placed to bear the loss, ie the 
owner.52  The UCC takes a probability-based approach to nemo dat conflicts, and there is a 
greater likelihood the owner will be ‘the most efficient loss bearer’.53  It is easier for the 
owner to take extra measures (e.g. insurance) to prevent losses than for the purchaser to fully 
ascertain the clarity of the title to the goods.54  The UCC nemo dat law has a firm theoretical 
foundation, where the policies and purposes that inform it are clear and understood, as well as 
being broadly supported, by courts and commentators.  The general policy of simplification, 
clarification and modernization of commercial law dovetails neatly with the policies of 
protecting purchasers and reducing the burden of risk of loss to form a meta-policy of 
preventing delays, and thus costs, in transactions.55  The effect of this can be seen in the 
substantive doctrine of the UCC.   
1) UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 
Article 9 was the subject of two major revisions in 1972 and in 1998.56  The 1998 version, 
Revised Article 9, is different in both substance and nomenclature,57 and it is that version 
which is analysed herein.58  Whilst the drafters of the original Article 9 felt they were merely 
collating and codifying pre-UCC law,59 Article 9 has since been acclaimed as 
‘revolutionary’;60 the UCC’s ‘signal achievement’.61  Prior to the UCC the US law of credit 
and security was complex and incoherent.62  The revolutionary element of Article 9 was the 
imposition of a single overarching concept of a ‘security interest’,63 which focused on the 
substance of the interest, not its form: ‘the label does not control the result.’64  Thus Article 9 
applies to ‘a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal 
property or fixtures by contract’,65 with ‘security interest’ defined as ‘an interest in personal 
property … which secures payment or performance of an obligation.’66  The breadth of the 
security interest concept means many different commercial transactions will give rise to a 
security interest, and for these purposes it is vital to accept that a retention of title clause is 
deemed to be a security interest by §1-201(b)(35): ‘The retention or reservation of title by a 
seller of goods … is limited in effect to a reservation of a “security interest.”’67  These simple 
words clearly demonstrate that no matter what effort an original owner of goods may put into 
attempts to protect himself from the risk of non-payment by a purchaser, his retention of title 
will merely provide him with a security interest.68 
Transposing the facts of Highway Foods to the context of Article 9, Harris and 
Highway would have both obtained a security interest (their respective retention of title 
clauses) following disposition of the goods (first to Highway, then to Kingfry).  In both 
transactions, the retention of title clause operated as a means to secure payment.  The level of 
protection for security interests under Article 9 depends on whether they are perfected.69  
Perfection can be (crudely) described as a formality process which essentially focuses on 
registration of the pertinent details of the security arrangement.70  Generally, if a security 
interest is not perfected,71 it will be ineffective as against a good faith purchaser for value 
without notice who obtains delivery of the goods prior to perfection.72  Nevertheless, even 
perfected security interests can be defeated using the nemo dat exceptions set out in Article 
9.73  As will be shown, even if Harris and Highway had perfected their security interests, the 
facts of that case demonstrate that the UCC would have provided “protection” for Kingfry 
otherwise unavailable under English law. 
For Fairfax, if the situation had arisen under Article 9 jurisdiction, then both claimant 
and defendant would have merely had a security interest.  As with Highway Foods, the 
retention of title clauses introduced by claimant and defendant operated in order to secure 
payment.  In Fairfax, the Court of Appeal held that the defendants obtained title free of the 
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claimant’s claims, because there had been an implied authority to pass title.  Under the UCC, 
the same result would occur.  For Loi, this is problematic as it prioritises an implication as 
opposed to the express provisions of the agreements.74  However, the UCC sets the 
authorisation of such transactions in the context of nemo dat conflicts.  Thus, as the following 
analysis will show, if English law adopted the UCC Article 9 provisions on retention of title 
clauses and authorisation, the wrong decision in Highway Foods would be rectified and the 
correct, but poorly rationalised, decision in Fairfax would obtain a solid justificatory 
foundation. 
2) THE EXCEPTIONS TO SURVIVAL OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN GOODS 
SOLD: §9-315 
Under Article 9, the general rule is that a security interest survives disposition of the 
collateral.75  This functions as a nemo dat rule.  However, a security interest will not survive a 
disposition if ‘the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest’.76  
Authorisation of the disposition would leave the authorising party, who held the security 
interest (ie the retention of title clause), with only the right (under the retention of title clause) 
to claim the proceeds of the sale from the disposing party.77 
Although it appears from the wording of §9-315(a) that nemo dat conflicts involving 
security interests can be assessed under the provisions of §2-403(2) (the ‘entrustment’ 
provision), for reasons of economy this analysis will consider the position solely in the 
context of Article 9, which accords with the nature of the Highway Foods and Fairfax 
disputes as ones clearly concerning security interests (and their consequent rights and 
obligations).  Although §9-320(a) is ‘by far the most important’ nemo dat exception in 
Article 9,78 the fact sub-sales had been authorised by the secured party in the course of the 
security agreement renders it unnecessary for purchasers to rely on §9-320(a).79  There is no 
need to even assess whether the purchaser was a buyer in ordinary course of business (the 
fundamental requirement regarding the purchaser’s status under the §9-320 provision) 
because under §9-315(a) it is the fact of authorisation which is vital.  Where authorisation is 
involved, such transactions (like those in Highway Foods and Fairfax) ‘are more properly 
governed by [§9-315(a)] rather than [§9-320(a)] because the transfers appear to have been 
authorized dispositions of collateral’.80 
IV. Authorisation Under §9-315(a) as a Nemo Dat Exception 
Under §9-315(a), if Harris had ‘authorized the disposition free of the security interest’ then 
Highway would have been able to dispose of the goods to Kingfry.81  Harris’s security 
interest (the retention of title clause) would continue not in the meat itself,82 but in the 
proceeds of the disposition that he had authorised.83  This alteration of the security interest 
occurs ‘not because of the meritorious character of the buyer but because the secured party 
has agreed that a buyer may acquire rights thereby.’84  The same logical process would also 
apply in Fairfax.  The policy behind this particular provision is an extension of the general 
policies of the UCC and the nemo dat provisions in particular, whereby authorisation of a 
sub-sale means that the holder of the security interest has essentially abandoned any claim to 
the goods themselves,85 and had in effect chosen to retain an interest merely in the proceeds.  
In conflicts between a secured party and a third-party purchaser, the secured party is the one 
that should bear the loss arising from his debtor’s actions,86 because the alternative essentially 
makes the purchaser an insurer of events beyond his knowledge and/or control (ie the 
remittance of the proceeds of the seller), which would be unacceptable in light of the general 
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principles and policies of the UCC.87  Most emphatic is the opinion of the US Bankruptcy 
Court in In re Woods:  
 
The secured party who knows of the debtor’s delivery of the collateral to a merchant 
for sale cannot lie in wait until the merchant has misled some innocent buyer and then 
recover the collateral on the ground that it did not authorize the sale in writing. 
Whether viewed as a waiver of the writing requirement or an estoppel, the result is the 
same – authorization of the sale.88 
1) THE RETENTION OF TITLE CLAUSE IN HIGHWAY FOODS 
The meaning of authorisation is ‘determined not only with reference to the facts surrounding 
the particular transfer at issue but also with reference to the provisions of the security 
agreement under which the authorization is supposed to have taken place.’89  This analysis 
takes the same approach.  Of prime importance is the security agreement between Harris and 
Highway, which will now be analysed in the context of the UCC’s provisions.  The retention 
of title clause read: 
 
The ownership of the goods in the original or any altered form will only be transferred 
to the buyer when he has paid all that is owing to the seller.  On resale the buyer shall 
remain accountable to the seller for the whole of the proceeds of the sale(s) so long as 
any indebtedness whatever remains outstanding from the buyer to the seller.  The 
seller reserves the right to enter and collect from any premises goods in their original 
or altered form where moneys are overdue, or where bankruptcy/liquidation 
proceedings are pending/effective, or a receiver has been appointed.90 
 
The first sentence may be interpreted as requiring Highway to pay just the cost of the goods 
(a straight retention of title) or it may be that Highway had to pay all of the debts owed to 
Harris (an expanded, or “all-monies” retention of title).  The second sentence appears to 
create a mixed retention of title clause,91 but this is not the same as saying that Highway is 
obliged to pay all the debts.  The second sentence may also be interpreted as meaning that 
Harris allows sub-sales.  This may at first seem uncontroversial, but further examination of 
the American case-law demonstrates the complexity of assessing implied authorisation.  The 
third sentence implies that Harris recognised the possibility of a disposition of the goods by 
Highway, but it is arguable that this acknowledgement only extends as far as a disposition of 
the possession due to the omission of a specific reference to the sub-sale of the goods.  It was 
this part of the clause that Harris was referring to when it wrote to Highway to say that it was 
exercising its right to possession following the expiry of the date upon which Highway had to 
pay for the meat.92  In light of the provisions of Article 9 though, the key issue would be 
whether Harris had in fact already authorised the disposition free of the security interest prior 
to the repossession. 
Although Harris clearly intended to retain title, there is no express prohibition against a 
sub-sale prior to the condition on payment being met.  This raises the issue, fundamental to 
this analysis, of whether the particular nature of the retention of title clause would allow, 
under American law, for the disposition to Kingfry to be one that passed title irrespective of 
Harris’s claim.93 
2) THE PROVISIONS OF THE UCC 
UCC §9-315(a) reads as follows: 
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 Except as otherwise provided in this article and in Section 2-403(2): 
(1) a security interest or agricultural lien continues in collateral 
notwithstanding sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition thereof 
unless the secured party authorized the disposition free of the security interest 
or agricultural lien; and 
(2) a security interest attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral. 
 
It is a revision of (old) §9-306(2), which provided that ‘a security interest continues in 
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof unless the disposition 
was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also 
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor.’  Official 
Comment 2 for §9-315 provides the reasoning for the changes in the law: 
 
In many cases, a purchaser or other transferee of collateral will take free of a security 
interest, and the secured party’s only right will be to proceeds.  For example, the 
general rule does not apply, and a security interest does not continue in collateral, if 
the secured party authorized the disposition, in the agreement that contains the 
security agreement or otherwise.  Subsection (a)(1) adopts the view of [Permanent 
Editorial Board] Commentary No. 3 and makes explicit that the authorized disposition 
to which it refers is an authorized disposition “free of” the security interest or 
agricultural lien.  The secured party’s right to proceeds under this section or under the 
express terms of an agreement does not in itself constitute an authorization of 
disposition.  The change in language from former Section 9-306(2) is not intended to 
address the frequently litigated situation in which the effectiveness of the secured 
party’s consent to a disposition is conditioned upon the secured party’s receipt of the 
proceeds.  In that situation, subsection (a) leaves the determination of authorization to 
the courts, as under former Article 9. 
 
Thus it is clear that whether the particular situation involved an authorised disposition would 
depend upon the particular facts of each case, to be determined by the courts.  This factual 
determination needs to be made in the light of the Permanent Editorial Board’s Commentary 
No 3 on (old) §9-306(2), as referred to in the Official Comment cited above.  The relevant 
part of that Commentary is set out: 
 
The intent underlying this exception is to permit a disposition of the collateral free 
and clear of the security interest when the secured party has authorized the disposition 
free and clear of its security interest in the security agreement or otherwise.  In the 
case of such an authorized disposition, the general rule of survivability of the security 
interest set forth in §9-306(2) will not apply and the security interest will terminate 
upon the disposition.  However, this exception to the rule of survivability only applies 
if the secured party has authorized the disposition, by agreement or otherwise, free 
and clear of the security interest.  The exception will not apply if the secured party 
did not authorize the disposition of the collateral or if the secured party authorized the 
disposition subject to its security interest.  This authorization issue presents a factual 
question.  The questions of what facts will constitute an effective express or implied 
authorization for purposes of this Section and what standard of proof is applicable to 
this determination are not addressed in the Code but are instead left to other law. 
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The following requirements can be drawn from this Commentary.  There needs to be a 
disposition, and there must be an ‘effective express or implied authorization’, which occurred 
‘by agreement or otherwise’.  The disposition of the collateral to the purchaser has to be a 
‘sale, lease, license, exchange, or other disposition’.94  §2-106(1) states that a sale ‘consists in 
the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price’.95  §2-103(1)(a) defines a buyer as 
‘a person that buys or contracts to buy goods.’96  This is not entirely helpful, but in Gordon v 
Hamm the Second District of the Court of Appeal of California considered this issue in the 
context of (old) §9-306, where the solution was found in the definition of ‘buyer in ordinary 
course of business’ in §1-201(b)(9), which states that ‘a buyer in ordinary course of business 
may buy for cash, by exchange of other property, or on secured or unsecured credit’.97  
Although there is no buyer in ordinary course of business requirement in cases of 
authorisation, this definition helpfully demonstrates that a purchaser can buy on secured 
credit, which was the situation between Highway and Kingfry.98  §2-401(2) states that 
‘[u]nless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which 
the seller completes performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite 
any reservation of a security interest’.  All Highway had was a security interest, therefore title 
had passed and the transaction between Highway and Kingfry was a sale.  Again, the same 
logic applies to the facts in Fairfax.  The important conclusion from this is that the problem 
highlighted in Highway Foods, that of the non-applicability of the FA, s. 9 provision covering 
agreements to sell, would not arise under the UCC because the location of title during the 
transaction is not determinative of the transaction’s validity and capacity to pass title. 
3) AUTHORISATION 
As the Permanent Editorial Board’s Commentary makes clear, the authorised disposition 
must be made so that the disposition is ‘free and clear of the security interest’.  This 
requirement does not appear to carry a substantial weight though.  Whether there is a 
disposition ‘free and clear’ depends on the nature of the authorisation itself.  If there is no 
authorisation, then the disposition is not ‘free and clear’ of the security interest.99  
Conversely, if there is agreement that upon disposition the security interest will only attach to 
proceeds then there is no intention to attach to the collateral, and thus the authorisation 
exception is irrelevant (in the sense that the disposition is implicitly authorised as being free 
and clear of security interest).  As a limitation on the security interest could show an attempt 
to avoid the effects of the authorisation provision, courts are obliged to decide whether the 
authorisation in the particular case is sufficient to get around any such limitations rendering 
the disposition ‘free and clear’. 
The US courts have tended towards the position whereby an authorising act can of itself 
demonstrate that the authorisation was free and clear – it is the fact of authorisation that 
matters.  In effect the secured party is estopped from claiming the benefit of the express term 
of the security agreement.100  For one, it seems that where there are sales of inventory, as 
opposed to equipment, then authorisation free and clear will be more readily found.101  
Inventory is defined as ‘goods, other than farm products, which: ... (B) are held by a person 
for sale or lease or to be furnished under a contract of service ... or (D) consist of raw 
materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business.’102  Equipment 
‘means goods other than inventory, farm products, or consumer goods.’103  Thus it is clear 
that in Highway Foods, the relevant goods were inventory.  The impact of this is discussed 
later in this analysis.104  The position in Fairfax is somewhat different.  The goods in Fairfax 
appear at first glance to be equipment.  However, this would be to focus too much on the 
goods themselves as opposed to their nature in the context of the transaction.  In the 
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transaction concerned, the goods were clearly inventory: they were purchased in order to be 
sub-sold. 
There is a considerable volume of case-law, mainly arising under (old) §9-306(2), 
which provides evidence about the level of authorisation necessary to demonstrate that the 
owner has authorised a disposition of goods free and clear of the security interest he had in 
said goods.105  This jurisprudence will now be analysed.  The first point to be covered will be 
the ineffectiveness of mere inaction by the secured party.  Following this will be an outline of 
examples of express and unconditional authorisations which suffice to allow a disposition 
unencumbered by the security interest.  Then express, but conditional, authorisations will be 
considered.  Finally implied authorisations will be analysed.   
a) Inaction 
As the US District Court for Indiana has said: ‘Mere silence, acquiescence or inactivity is not 
a waiver or authorization unless there was a duty to speak or act.’106  This of course begs the 
question: what suffices to demonstrate authorisation?   
b) Express and unconditional authorisation 
In Matter of Special Abrasives, the US Bankruptcy Court in Michigan stated that ‘it is basic 
hornbook law that an explicit authorization cuts off the secured creditor’s security interest.’107  
An explicit authorisation of sales of inventory, such as where the terms of the security 
agreement show that the sale of the collateral was authorised,108 will mean that a sale of 
inventory will provide the purchaser with goods free and clear of the secured party’s 
interest.109  Thus unconditional authorisation of sale of collateral relegates a security interest 
to the proceeds.110  This seems to make sense: it would be unjust for a party to authorise a 
disposition and then attempt to deny the meaning or value of that transaction at a later date, 
and as such where a secured party expressly authorises a sale they are ‘bound by these 
authorizations and cannot neglect that language of its own instrument’.111  Furthermore, if the 
secured party expressly agrees the disputed goods are for resale, such action may suffice to 
demonstrate authorisation,112 and it has been suggested that the fact that the debtor was a 
retailer meant it might be assumed that the secured party envisaged resales of the goods and 
thus authorised such dispositions.113 
In Fairfax, the agreement allowed for a disposition in the ordinary course of 
business.114  In itself this is not an explicit authorisation; obviously the ordinary course of 
business requirement is some form of limitation on the powers to dispose, but for these 
purposes it needs to be acknowledged that the problems arising in Fairfax concerned the 
failure of the secured party to properly protect themselves by agreement.  What is more 
interesting is the effect of the US approach on the agreement in Highway Foods.  Harris and 
Highway appear to have acknowledged the possibility of a resale, but acknowledging such a 
possibility is not the same as acknowledging resale as a certainty.115  Conversely, the absence 
of express authorisation for the sub-sale does not inhibit the possibility of implied 
authorisation.  Implied authorisation is considered later; first it is necessary to consider the 
impact of conditions on security agreements such as an obligation to pay the proceeds to the 
secured party to cover any debt. 
c) Conditional authorisation 
‘There is nothing in the Code ... to prevent a secured party from attaching conditions or 
limitations to its consent to sales of collateral by a debtor.’116  One such condition may be an 
obligation on the debtor to obtain written consent prior to any disposition, the effect of failure 
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to obtain such consent being that the sale is unauthorised and the security interest remains 
attached to the collateral.117  There is jurisprudence indicating that such a condition takes 
precedence over a possible contextual implication of authorisation, such as that deriving from 
trade usage or course of dealing.118  Thus express conditions that sub-purchasers take subject 
to the security interest will prevail absent contrary manifest intention.119   
State and federal courts have wrestled with the problem of dispositions conditional 
upon the debtor remitting the proceeds of such dispositions.120  On one hand it has been held 
that ‘a sale by the debtor in violation of those conditions is an unauthorized sale and the 
security interest, under [§9-315], continues in the collateral.’121  However, this appears to be a 
minority view.  Thus the Supreme Court of Iowa has held that authorisation was ‘unaffected 
by a finding … that the authority to sell was conditioned upon the debtor’s agreement to 
apply the proceeds to the debt’.122  In 1980, in First National Bank & Trust Co v Iowa Beef 
Processors, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the key determinant was that the 
sub-sale was authorised, and not that it was conditioned on the debtor remitting proceeds, on 
the grounds that if proceeds clauses had super-priority over sub-sales, then an innocent 
purchaser would be ‘an insurer of acts beyond its control’ and that the UCC’s policy to 
‘promote ready exchange in the marketplace’ necessitated the Court’s conclusion.123  Since 
then, similar approaches towards proceeds clauses have been taken by a variety of state and 
federal courts.124  The fact of authorisation is dominant: ‘no distinction is made between 
conditional authorization or any other kind of authorization.  As between a third party 
purchaser who agreed to no condition and the security holder which permitted the goods to be 
placed on the market, clearly the third party has superior right to the goods.’125  Obviously 
this approach is useful in the Highway Foods context.  It can also be argued that this 
prevailing UCC approach would provide a stronger rationale for the decision in Fairfax, and 
would counter Loi’s argument that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Fairfax unnecessarily 
stretched the meaning of the particular contractual terms:126 commercial law may sometimes 
have to do violence to a contract in order to adhere to a rational higher policy or purpose. 
d) Implied authorisation 
In the early UCC decision of Clovis National Bank v Thomas the Supreme Court of New 
Mexico held that implied authorisation was possible.127  This result was immediately 
abrogated by the New Mexico legislature,128 and it seemed as if the alternative approach 
expressed in the Nebraskan case Garden City Production Credit Association v Lannan,129 
that the written terms of the security agreement took priority, would predominate.130  Thus in 
Wabasso State Bank v Caldwell Packing Co,131 the Supreme Court of Minnesota held, 
following Lannan, that the presence of express terms in the security agreement requiring 
prior written consent to sub-sales, along with state legislation providing that such express 
terms control both course of dealing and trade usage, meant that a mere course of dealing 
would be unable to contradict those agreed express terms.  Later, in Tennessee Production 
Credit Association v Gold Kist,132 the Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that the failure to 
object to the debtor sub-selling foods without consent, along with an acceptance of the 
proceeds of such sales, was an insufficient course of conduct to demonstrate authorisation.  
To hold otherwise would mean that the secured party would be presented with a fait 
accompli, and would lose its interest far too easily.133 
Nevertheless, the Clovis approach appears to have succeeded in the long run.  The 
initial step in the justification of implied authorisation was the recognition that oral consent 
will suffice even though written consent is prescribed.134  Furthermore, the Lannan case was 
itself overruled.135  Most importantly though, the actual wording of the UCC’s provisions 
demonstrates the validity of implied consent. 
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Whilst (old) §9-306 (2) stated that the security interest would not attach to the goods 
themselves where the disposition was authorised ‘or otherwise’, which could be interpreted 
as allowing implied authorisations,136 the current provision (§9-315 (a)) does not have such a 
useful phrase.  However, it is repeated in the Official Comments,137 which seems to suggest 
that authorisation by implication may well still be valid.  Thus whilst in Matter of Matto’s it 
was noted that a qualifying authorisation had to be clear and unambiguous,138 and the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska has stated that an implied authorisation should only be found 
with ‘extreme hesitancy’ and only where there is ‘clear and convincing evidence’,139 there 
appears to be a convincing volume of authority that implied authorisation is possible.140 
Certain factors can be elucidated from the case-law in order to map the boundaries of 
implied authorisation.  Four main factors appear determinative: (1) the secured party’s 
conduct;141 (2) the course of dealing between the parties;142 (3) the customary practice in the 
trade;143 and (4) the particular context of the transaction,144 including the circumstances of the 
parties,145 and the nature of the collateral itself.146  Obviously the longer the course of dealing 
goes on, the more likely there is to be implied authorisation,147 but six months has been held 
sufficient.148  At the other end of the scale, it is clear that a course of dealing can be ended by 
one of the parties.  In First State Bank v Shirley Ag Service,149 a bank had a security interest 
in crops, but the farmer was granted implied authority to sell those crops.  The bank decided 
to foreclose, and served notice to the farmer.  This action was deemed to be sufficient to end 
the course of dealing, thus the subsequent disposition of crops by the farmer was not 
authorised.150 
Fundamentally, there must be a demonstration of ‘a voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known and existing right’,151 which is ‘clearly apparent from the 
circumstances’;152 it cannot be ‘lightly implied’.153  Yet it is also important to acknowledge 
the caveat recently provided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals: ‘[n]o magic language of 
release is required’.154   
So where from the beginning of the relationship with the debtor the bank allowed sub-
sales of secured goods without objection and took the cheques for such sales as credit for the 
debtor’s account, and had relied on the debtor to properly account for the proceeds, the Iowa 
Supreme Court held that there was an established course of dealing demonstrating implied 
authorisation.155  Similarly, the US Bankruptcy Court has held that when a creditor permits a 
debtor to sell goods in a manner of the debtor’s choosing, whilst relying on the debtor to 
remit the funds and failing to require the debtor to obtain written authority prior to sale, the 
creditor may be seen as acquiescing in the sale.156  Essentially, the more laissez-fair the 
secured party’s attitude towards protecting their interest, the more likely implied 
authorisation will be found.  In Gretna State Bank v Cornbelt Livestock Co the bank had 
never discussed its policy of requiring prior written permission before cattle were sold 
(apparently, this lack of discussion was with all debtors, not just the one involved in this 
case), and had failed to act upon previous instances of sub-sales of cattle as well as a when 
the particular debtor sub-sold cattle.  The bank was seemingly unconcerned with sub-sales of 
cattle provided the overall size of the herd remained constant, and this was further 
demonstrated by the bank only declaring debtors to be in default when they allowed the 
overall size of their herds of cattle to drop below what would be required for adequate 
production of milk (in this particular case, a herd of around sixty).  Unsurprisingly, the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska held this demonstrated implied authorisation.157  Four years later 
the US Bankruptcy Court, applying Nebraskan law, was faced with a case where a secured 
party consented to sales of hogs by the middleman.  The purchaser was a party to some of 
those sales, following which he permitted goods to remain in the middleman’s possession 
without disclosure of the purchaser’s interest.  The Court held that the purchaser took free of 
the security interest, as there had been an authorised disposition.  Five main factors were 
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mentioned: first, the security agreement contemplated that proceeds from the sale of the hogs 
would be used to service the relevant debt; second, the secured party was aware that such 
sales of the hogs were the middleman’s main source of income; third, the secured party failed 
to fully investigate the middleman’s business; fourth, the secured party failed to expressly 
prohibit sub-sales; and fifth, the secured party did not even discuss with the middleman any 
possible limitations as to sub-sales.158   
One common problem concerns the effect of proceeds clauses.  The original UCC 
provision, §9-306(2), and the Official Comments thereto, appeared to suggest that the use of 
a proceeds clause in the security agreement could provide evidence that the secured party 
impliedly authorised a sub-sale of the goods.159  Whilst the revisions to Article 9 in 1972 
reduced the possibility of such an interpretation, it was not eradicated.  Thus in 1988 the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that ‘a claim to proceeds is one factor to consider in 
determining whether the secured party has impliedly authorized the sale of collateral.  
Certainly it is not dispositive.’160  The next year the Supreme Court of Alaska took a similar 
view, that an express provision that the secured party would retain an interest in the proceeds 
in the event of a sale did not of itself provide sufficient evidence of implied authorisation.161  
The restrictive interpretation of the effect of proceeds clauses continued following the 1998 
revisions, where the Official Comments makes it clear that the ‘secured party’s right to 
proceeds under [§9-315] or under the express terms of an agreement does not in itself 
constitute an authorization of disposition.’162  However, the Official Comments also state that  
 
The change in language from former Section 9-306(2) is not intended to address the 
frequently litigated situation in which the effectiveness of the secured party’s consent to 
a disposition is conditioned upon the secured party’s receipt of the proceeds.  In that 
situation, subsection (a) leaves the determination of authorization to the courts, as under 
former Article 9.163 
 
A proceeds clause, though insufficient to determine the issue by itself, can provide evidence 
of an acceptance by the secured party of the possibility of a sub-sale, and potentially even 
evidence of consent by the secured party to a sub-sale.  The key turning point appears to be 
where the secured party goes beyond claiming a mere right to the proceeds, and 
acknowledges that the collateral is inventory, the very purpose of which is to be resold.  This 
was recognised early in the UCC’s life, where the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
there was an implied authorisation, because the goods were regarded as inventory, and the 
whole purpose of inventory is to be sold.164  Thus, in Finance America Commercial Corp v 
Econo,165 where a security agreement provided for a security interest in ‘all of the Collateral 
and ... the proceeds thereof covering Inventory’, it was held such a description meant the 
secured party contemplated a possible sub-sale.  Furthermore, the secured party contemplated 
that his interest would continue into the proceeds.  This provided sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that the debtor’s sale of the goods was authorised.166  The approach in the Econo 
case replicated that taken by the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama in Frank Davis Buick 
AMC-Jeep v First Alabama Bank of Huntsville.167  There a failure to prohibit sub-sales 
combined with a requirement that the secured party be paid as soon as the goods covered by 
the security agreement are sold, meant that there was authorisation by the secured party of 
sales of such goods.168  Requiring immediate repayment from the proceeds of the sub-sale 
crystallizes the purpose of the retention of title clause as being a means of securing 
repayment rather than being a mechanism for controlling the goods themselves.169  Thus ‘a 
secured party with a security interest in the inventory of a retail seller may be assumed to 
have authorized the sale of inventory to purchasers.’170  Indeed, the US Bankruptcy Court for 
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the Western District, Virginia, has gone as far as considering it to be ‘axiomatic’ that in sales 
of inventory the secured party authorises such sales.171 
V. Conclusion 
UCC §9-315(a), in providing that authorised dispositions merely result in the secured party 
having an interest in the proceeds of the sub-sale (as opposed to the security interest 
following the goods themselves down the chain of transactions), gives body to the 
‘underlying philosophy of the UCC [which] is to protect the security interest so long as it 
does not interfere with the normal flow of commerce.’172  It provides protection for the 
purchaser, whose level of knowledge or control over the behaviour and actions of parties 
further up the chain of transactions will be limited.  The burden of the risk of loss is placed 
firmly with the secured party, who is in the best position to assess the value (as against the 
risk) of allowing someone to have control of their goods without having purchased them 
outright in the first instance.  With these expressions of policy in mind, it becomes agreeable 
to accept that under §9-315(a) Highway’s receiver could have succeeded in showing that the 
title to the goods had in fact passed to the purchaser (Kingfry) prior to the “repossession” by 
Harris.  This would have occurred because Harris’s interest was solely focused on the 
proceeds of the sale of the meat.  Indeed, it may be possible to state that generally ‘[a]s a 
matter of everyday practice the seller/supplier would only be concerned with payment, and if 
this could come about only via sub-sale, then so be it.’173  This is obvious in the context of 
the original transaction, whereby Harris sold to Highway, who then sold to Kingfry.  In this 
initial transaction, Harris was concerned with receiving payment.  The failure to receive 
payment led to Harris repossessing the goods under the terms of its retention of title clause.  
However, Harris did not actually physically repossess the goods: he left them with Kingfry, 
and this bailment was predicated on the future purchase of the goods by Kingfry direct from 
Harris.  Thus at all parts of the transaction, Harris was solely concerned with the money 
value, ie the proceeds.  With this in mind, it is difficult to separate out Highway Foods from 
the general tenor of the UCC itself and the relevant case-law.  In particular, the privileged 
position of inventory, where the acceptance of the possibility, indeed the necessity, of a sub-
sale in order to generate the proceeds needed to service the debt, appears to suggest quite 
strongly that Harris had impliedly authorised the disposition by Highway.  The retention of 
title clause between Harris and Highway clearly evidenced a wish on Harris’s part to obtain 
the proceeds of sale, but not to retain the goods themselves.  This would of course be the 
opposing conclusion to that reached under English law.  A similar understanding of Fairfax 
can also be constructed in light of the lessons of the UCC.  Of course, with Fairfax, there was 
no doubt about the point of the transaction: it was in order to allow for a re-sale of the goods.  
What can be thus drawn from seeing Fairfax through the lens of the UCC is that the 
conclusion there, so awkwardly reached and subject to critique by Loi, would be swiftly 
reached, with ease, and would be fully within the policy and doctrine of UCC Article 9 (and, 
indeed, of the UCC as a whole). 
Does the American law really provide an agreeable alternative?  Would it not be 
acceptable to simply allow the secured party and the purchaser to agree to cut the middleman 
out of the deal, just as what happened in Highway Foods?  There is force in this suggestion, 
but it can be critiqued on the grounds it could lead to the secured party and the purchaser 
deliberately failing to pay the middleman, which essentially collapses into a mild form of 
fraud against the middleman.  More importantly though, it appears that this approach, unless 
restricted to classic three-party disputes, could lead to situations of rapidly increasing levels 
of complexity.  If there are multiple secured parties, are they all to be contacted, and 
negotiated into agreement, by the purchaser?  If there are multiple purchasers, must the same 
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extensive process be undertaken by the secured party?  Where there are multiple purchasers 
and security parties, the costs involved would clearly exceed any benefits.  What if such an 
approach is restricted just to clear three-party disputes?  It could be argued that there are still 
problems of transaction costs.  It is arguable that the most sensible path for commercial law is 
to reinforce a uni-directional chain of transactions.174  The alternative, allowing the 
unravelling of such chains so that parties not directly connected (e.g. secured party and 
purchaser, as opposed to the direct connection between secured party and middleman, or 
middleman and purchaser) can attempt to shorten the chain of transactions, may admit more 
uncertainty than is appropriate in the field of commercial deals.  The importance of clarity 
and coherency in this area of law is necessitated by the clear popularity of retention of title 
clauses.  Prohibiting the unravelling of chains of transactions could have benefits in terms of 
certainty for sub-purchasers, ie those purchasers who only have a limited knowledge of 
and/or little control over the nature of the transactions between, say the secured party, 
middleman and purchaser.  Goode has noted the distinction between inherent and systemic 
risk.  Systemic risk (affecting the market as a whole) is for regulators to deal with.  Inherent 
risk ‘should be seen as a necessary consequence of a market-orientated society.’175  He noted 
that business failure can be attributed to one or more of three causes: (1) fraud (which is 
exceptional, and though it is detectable it is not preventable); (2) mismanagement (‘a 
manifestation of inherent human frailty’); and (3) bad luck (like fraud, it is exceptional and 
unpreventable).  Since only non-participation can eradicate risk resulting from causes (1) and 
(2), the basic policy is one of risk management: which party is best placed to bear the risk of 
loss?  In a world of retained title, this is a vital question.  For the purposes of Article 9 and 
title conflicts, it is deemed to be the owner rather than the purchaser.  This is in contrast to the 
English law, where the purchaser will bear the risk of loss beyond that which he can possibly 
manage. 
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of Yealick’s Estate 69 IllApp3d 353, 387 NE2d 399 at 401 (1979); Mammoth Cave Production Credit 
Association v Oldham 569 SW2d 833 at 839-40 (TennApp 1977). 
82 As it would were the disposition unauthorised: see e.g. Farmer’s State Bank of Delavan v Easton Farmers 
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100 Finance America Commercial Corp v Econo Coach 118 IllApp3d 385, 454 NE2d 1127 at 1129 (1983): 
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